China spy row shifts UK critical engagement strategy
Enhanced tier of Foreign Influence Registration Scheme now more likely
The Times has new details on the Chinese influence allegations broached by its sister paper yesterday.
A Tory parliamentary researcher arrested on suspicion of spying for China was the director of an influential policy group on Beijing co-founded by the security minister.
Chris Cash, 28, was closely linked with Tom Tugendhat and was employed as a researcher by Alicia Kearns, chairwoman of the Commons foreign affairs committee (ref 1).
The researcher in question has released a statement through solicitors Birnberg Pierce:
I feel forced to respond to the media accusations that I am a ‘Chinese spy’. It is wrong that I should be obliged to make any form of public comment on the misreporting that has taken place.
However, given what has been reported, it is vital that it is known that I am completely innocent. I have spent my career to date trying to educate others about the challenge and threats presented by the Chinese Communist party.
To do what has been claimed against me in extravagant news reporting would be against everything I stand for (ref 2).
The Guardian’s liveblog on the latest developments has some extracts from a BBC interview this morning with former MI6 chief Alex Younger. His comments underline something I mentioned in my previous piece. Western analysts see Chinese intelligence as encompassing more activities than would be defined as such elsewhere.
The scope is far broader than anything we would defined as intelligence here. It includes information more broadly and influence. The significance of influence – undisclosed attempts to change the way in which people behave – is underestimated within our system. It’s not something we’re familiar with. It is fundamental to the way China operates.
But how far is this a distinction in the way China operates, rather than in the way others interpret its activities? The problem is made more acute because intelligence itself is a slippery concept. Some definitions focus on ‘information-gathering’ others focus on ‘covert activity.’
All states engage in intelligence-gathering by the former definition, but those activities may be increasingly interpreted in terms of the latter definition when inter-state relations deteriorate. Some of the Chinese activities now seen as subversive might have been considered tolerable and even desirable, when the British government was prioritising economic relations a decade ago.
In this respect, Younger is perhaps a touch disingenuous when he says influence ‘is not something we’re familiar with.’ Many of the methods so far attributed to alleged Chinese influence agent Christine Lee are the stock in trade of a large and not always transparent UK public affairs industry.
Lee made declared donations to MPs, formed an all-party parliamentary group and introduced Chinese companies to British lobbyists (ref 3). Other states, including other authoritarian states, are no doubt doing the same things without attracting the same attention. The heightened focus on Chinese intelligence may be as much consequence as cause of declining relations.
The latest arrest under the Official Secrets Act, could yet bring matters into the domain of traditional espionage, if it leads to a conviction. Certainly, there is extensive evidence of Chinese spying in the US, including infiltration of intelligence agencies (ref 4).
For now though, the UK allegations remain in murkier territory. One way of clarifying these situations is US-style foreign agent registration. The UK introduced such provisions in the recently passed National Security Act. Younger told the BBC that China probably should be designated under the act ‘as a particular state of concern, and therefore links to China should mandate additional reporting requirements’ (ref 2).
Conservative China hawks such as Iain Duncan Smith have been strongly pressing for this measure (ref 5). In the Commons this afternoon, Deputy Prime Minister Oliver Dowden sounded as if he was preparing to concede the point.
Other aspects of Younger’s argument are more in line with the Government’s existing approach.
I tend to switch off when I hear: ‘It’s a threat, isn’t a threat. We should call it a threat, we shouldn’t call it a threat. James Cleverly should go to China or not.’
We need to, geopolitically, be capable of chewing gum and walking at the same time.
Of course we need to engage with China. Of course we need to compete against China – in a way that it understands competition, by the way, linking economics and politics and security all together (ref 2).
Nevertheless, supporters of a more pragmatic line are likely to be under pressure after the latest developments. To understand why, consider this analysis from March:
In the wake of the Christine Lee affair, in which MI5 warned that a CCP ‘agent’ was operating in Westminster, lawmakers have recognised that the UK’s toolkit for dealing with malign interference is in need of updating. New counter state threat legislation is likely to include provisions on transparency in ownership and financing from authoritarian states. Partnerships between Chinese state-linked entities and British universities that risk compromising national security will also come under further scrutiny. In countering interference from hostile states, precision in our language and stated intentions will be crucial to protect diaspora groups that have been on the receiving end of an uptick in anti-Asian racism in recent times (ref 6).
To all appearances it is a fairly nuanced piece, and broadly in line with Government policy. Yet its author, Chris Cash, is the man reportedly accused of spying for China (ref 6).
The resulting investigation may have a chilling effect on those making similar arguments, long before it reaches any conclusion.
References
Ref 1: Billy Kenber, Steven Swinford, and Fiona Hamilton, Revealed: China spy suspect is parliamentary aide Chris Cash, The Times, 11 September 2023.
Ref 2: Andrew Sparrow, Parliamentary researcher arrested on suspicion of spying for China says he is ‘completely innocent’ – UK politics live, Guardian, 11 September 2023.
Ref 3: Gordon Corera, Why did MI5 name Christine Lee as an 'agent of influence'? BBC News, 19 July 2022.
Ref 4: Former CIA Officer Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Commit Espionage, US Department of Justice, 1 May 2019.
Ref 5: David Hughes, Sunak under pressure to take tougher line with China after alleged spy arrest, Independent, 11 September 2023.
Ref 6: Chris Cash, UK-China relations - what after the reset? SOAS China Institute, 10 March 2022.