The Cryptodiplomats
The intelligence chiefs who have become key players in international relations across the Middle East
Welcome! I’m Tom Griffin and this is my intelligence history newsletter. Feel free to share this post with the button below.
Back in December, I wrote about the centrality of intelligence liaison to diplomacy in the Middle East during the current conflict between Israel and Hamas. Since then I have produced a series of subscriber profiles on the intelligence chiefs involved. In this post, I want to highlight what I’ve learned about the key players.
I’ve stuck to intelligence professionals, which leaves out one important figure, Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani. Qatar experienced a crisis in relations with its Gulf neighbours between 2017 and 2021. It has since broken out of isolation and demonstrated an expertise in back-channel negotiations in conflict areas including Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq.1 Its capital, Doha, hosts the Hamas political office, and although it does not have official relations with Israel, there have long been high level contacts, making it a natural location for negotiations. In recent days, however, Qatar has come under renewed pressure to expel Hamas, and Al-Thani has complained of ‘defamation regarding its role in ongoing mediation efforts.’2
CIA Director William Burns: The first career diplomat to head the agency, Burns is best known for leading the back-channel contacts with Iran that paved the way for the 2015 nuclear agreement. At CIA, he has become the most high profile exponent of ‘intelligence diplomacy’, using information as a negotiating asset. His most notable success was anticipating Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, in the face of scepticism even in Kiev.3
Mossad Director David Barnea: Like Burns, Barnea has been closely associated with the Iranian nuclear file. However, in contrast to some Israeli agencies, Mossad has placed more faith in covert action than in negotiations.4 As head of Mossad’s human intelligence branch, Tzomet, and later as director of operations, Barnea is reputed to have played a significant role in implementing that policy. It has been suggested that his hawkish record makes him a more effective negotiator, assuring his counterparts that he speaks for Israel and not merely for a dovish faction of the government.5
Abbas Kamel, head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service: A career military officer, Kamel previously served as chief of staff to General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who became president by ousting his predecessor, Mohamed Morsi. Despite the long history of animosity between the Egyptian military regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, of which Hamas is an offshoot, Kamel has been another key interlocutor with the major Palestinian groups. To add to the complications, his service was accused last year of employing US Senator Robert Menendez as an agent.
Majed Faraj, head of the Palestinian General Intelligence Service. Born in a West Bank refugee camp where he grew up to become a Fatah activist, Faraj’s career exemplifies the contradictory pressures on the Palestinian Authority to provide security for the Israelis and its own people. In 2023, he was given ministerial status in a move seen by some as preparing for a Palestinian leadership transition. He was involved in reconciliation talks with Hamas in 2017, but during the current round of fighting the movement has accused him of infiltrating his officers into Gaza under the cover of escorting aid.
The ceasefire of late November has so far been the greatest success to emerge from post-October 7 intelligence contacts. While this produced the release of around 100 Israeli hostages, and over 200 Palestinian prisoners, the respite for the population of Gaza proved to be all too temporary.6
While contacts have continued, disputes over the number of hostages held by Hamas and the disposition of Israeli forces in the event of a ceasefire have proved intractable..
The broader escalation between Israel and Iran has also threatened to overwhelm the talks. It has been suggested that the involvement of Arab air defences in countering Iranian strikes portends the revival of an earlier phase of intelligence diplomacy.
As recently as the summer of 2023, Burns and Barnea were involved in talks about a grand bargain between the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia, a project championed by NSC official Brett McGurk across both the Trump and Biden administrations.7 The October 7 attacks were as a major blow to this policy which sought to achieve Arab-Israeli peace without resolving the Palestinian question. Yet recent months have seen an attempt integrate the reconstruction of Gaza into the wider plan for Saudi normalisation.8
The attempt may well be misconceived. The Guardian’s Patrick Wintour reports that ‘Saudi diplomats themselves have denied that they would jettison the Palestinians if Biden met Riyadh’s demands for its own security in return for normalisation with Israel.’9 The Times of Israel reports that many in the Biden Administration itself are sceptical of the White House’s belief that Prime Minister Netanyahu can move far enough to bring the Saudis on board.10
In this situation, it is tempting to see the turn to intelligence diplomacy as way of managing rather than solving deep political problems. The latest developments are sobering. Hamas has released a new hostage video, apparently in response to pressure from Qatar.11 Israeli officials including the chief of the Shin Bet security agency, Ronen Bar, have visited Cairo to discuss plans for an assault on Rafah, a Palestinian city on the border between Gaza and Egypt, currently thought to be sheltering some 1 million refugees.12
The only kernel of hope is the possibility that such sabre-rattling is the accompaniment to the sharp end of a negotiation.
Nadeen Ebrahim, How the tiny Arab state of Qatar became indispensable in talks with Hamas, CNN, 2 November 2023.
Frank Gardner, How Qatar is at the centre of Israeli hostage talks, BBC News, 26 October 2023.
Ruxandra Iordache, Qatar re-evaluates key mediator role in Middle East conflict on concerns of ‘political exploitation’, CNB C, 18 April 2024.
Jeremy Shapiro, Letter from Washington: All-knowing America and US intelligence diplomacy, European Council on Foreign Relations, 18 April 2024.
Ronen Bergman, Israeli Security Officials Are Divided Over Iran Nuclear Deal, New York Times, 14 July 2022.
Yonah Jeremy Bob, What is Mossad chief David Barnea’s role in hostage negotiations? - analysis, Jerusalem Post, 22 February 2024.
Andrew Mills, How Qatar's assertive diplomacy won a break in the Gaza war, Reuters, 1 December 2023.
50 Influential Jews: David Barnea - No. 10, Jerusalem Post, 15 September 2023.
Akbar Shahid Ahmed, A Top Biden Official Is Pushing An Urgent Post-Gaza Plan That’s Alarming Some Insiders, Huffpost, 13 January 2024.
Patrick Wintour, Gulf states’ response to Iran-Israel conflict may decide outcome of crisis, The Guardian, 19 April 2024.
Jacob Magid, US split over whether Netanyahu capable of accepting Palestinian component of Saudi deal, Times of Israel, 22 April 2024.
Barak Ravid, Qatar passed U.S. proof-of-life of Israeli-American hostage on Monday, Axios, 25 April 2024.
Barak Ravid, Top Israeli and Egyptian officials secretly meet to discuss possible Rafah invasion, 25 April 2024.